

Java Specification Request 321: Trusted Computing API for Java™

Tutorial on the Early Draft Review

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Expert Group JSR-321



Agenda

This is an overview of the upcoming Trusted Computing API for Java. It has recently finished early draft review! To be released under an open source license.

- Java & TC
- Lessons learned from TSS
- API Design
- Short Example
- Possibilities to influence the specification



Goal: Trusted Java Applications

Java is a natural choice for security critical software

- type-safe
- bounds-checking
- access control checks
- automated memory management
- rich network and cryptographic libraries
- A number of use cases for Trusted Computing in Java
 - Grid-Computing: policy enforcement, IP protection, data protection
 - Web-Services
 - DRM etc.
 - Remote Attestation Service
 - PrivacyCA
 - TPM Management Tools



Needed: Java Standard

- So far there has been no standard integration of Trusted Computing in Java.
- JSR321 is a Java Specification Request in the Java Community Process for a Trusted Computing API for the Java SE platform.

It is aimed to develop a Trusted Computing API for Java providing selected functionality the TCG Software Stack offers to the C world, while following the conventions of modern Java APIs.



The Expert Group

• Specification Lead: Ronald Toegl

The members of the JSR 321 Expert Group are

- Ronald Toegl and Peter Lipp, Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications (IAIK), Graz University Of Technology
- Nauman, Mohammad, Institute of Management Sciences, Pakistan
- Kenneth M. Graf, Intel Corp.
- Jeff Nisewanger, Sun Microsystems, Inc.
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- Winkler, Thomas, University of Klagenfurt, Austria
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Informal members of the Expert Group are

• Hong, Theodore, University of Cambridge



A look back at the TSS

TCG Software Stack (TSS) **Specification Version 1.2** Level 1

Errata A Part1: Commands and Structures March 7, 2007

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h	compat11b.h C/C++ Header 9,28 KB	h	platform.h C/C++ Header 1,17 KB	h	tcpa_defines.h C/C++ Header 128 Bytes	
h	tcpa_error.h C/C++ Header 122 Bytes	h	tcpa_struct.h C/C++ Header 125 Bytes	h	tcpa_typedef.h C/C++ Header 128 Bytes	
h	tcs.h C/C++ Header 50,8 KB		TCS.idl Interface Definition Langua 33,2 KB	h	tcs_defines.h C/C++ Header 948 Bytes	
h	tcs_error.h C/C++ Header 1,95 KB	h	tcs_structs.h C/C++ Header 985 Bytes	h	tcs_typedef.h C/C++ Header 768 Bytes	
h	tddl_error.h C/C++ Header 1,29 KB	h	tddlapi_error.h C/C++ Header 1,50 KB	h	tddli.h C/C++ Header 2,37 KB	
h	tpm.h C/C++ Header 56,8 KB	h	tpm_error.h C/C++ Header 19,6 KB	h	tpm_ordinal.h C/C++ Header 9,83 KB	
	TSP.idl Interface Definition Langua 27,7 KB	h	tspi.h C/C++ Header 43,8 KB	h	<mark>tss_defines.h</mark> C/C++ Header 51,6 KB	
h	tss_error.h C/C++ Header 15,1 KB	h	tss_error_basics.h C/C++ Header 1,62 KB	h	tss_structs.h C/C++ Header 15,3 KB	
h	tss_typedef.h C/C++ Header 1,80 KB					
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A look back at the TSS

TCG Software Stack (TSS) is the core software component specified by the TCG for interaction with the TPM

TSS design is provided and standardized by the TCG

TSS is specified (amongst others) to

- supply one single (exclusive) entry point to the TPM functionality
- synchronize TPM access
- TPM resource management (key slots, authorization sessions, ...)
- building of TPM commands messages according to TPM specification
- manage user secrets
- perform authentication protocols
- handle event log
- Provide APIs for application programmers

It covers **all** operation scenarios: OS, system administration, middleware and applications.



Lessons Learned for Java API Design

- Existing TSS-based infrastructure can be used to support a high-level library
- Usability needs to be improved to lower initial threshold for developers
- Scope needs to be limited to what (Java application) developers need
- Reference Implementations are more than just helpful especially as Open Source Indeed: *required* in the JCP!

→ JSR 321 is a high-level TC API for Java



Filtering Functionality

- TPM 1.2 only
- Remove features needed only by the BIOS, OS, system service,...
- Many TSS functions are simply not needed in Java[™]:
 - Management of memory and other resources can and should be hidden from application developers.
 - Object initialization and destruction are natural features of objectoriented languages.
 - Cryptographic primitives like hash functions are already well-supported in the Java[™] Cryptography Extension (JCE).
- Tested TSS implementations of functionality must be available



Filtering Functionality

- As heard JSR-104 with IAEK Graz an EG member has just been withdrawn.
- No Spec Lead
- The JSRs shared a few common ideas
- Motorola cutting back JCP involvement may have influenced, too
- Allows IAEK to focus more on active 321!
- While no immediate plans exist to integrate ideas from 104, people with interest there are welcome to JSR-321.

SCOS Graz University of Technology - Institute for Applied Information Processing and Communications



TSS C-Function Name Description Visible JSR 321 Object that will Reason for Removal or Implementation in API handle the functionality Tspi GetAttribUint32 Find out the value of an Access to basic No integer attribute of an information on TSS object. Tspi GetAttribData Get a non-integer attribute Access to basic No of an object. information on TSS Tspi GetPolicyObject Find out the current Hidden. Configured using Essential for Yes authorization policy Secret object processing associated with the context. commands Tspi Context Close Close a context. Context Sessions are Yes TPMContext essential to TPM Profession in Tspi Context Connect TPMContext Connect to a context after it Context Sessions are Yes is created. essential to TPM Tspi Context Create TPMContext Create a context. Context Sessions are Yes essential to TPM Tspi Context FreeMem Free memory allocated by a Java hides Memory ory **Tspi-level function**. Management Tspi Context GetDefa Use the default Essential No Hidden. Configured using ultPolicy authorization policy for the Secret object creation of an object. Tspi Context CreateO TPMContext Create an object, such as a TPM object live in Yes bject key object. After creating Contexts the object, the fields in the object need to be set. Tspi Context CloseOb Destroy an object. Java manages No ject resources Tspi Context GetCapa TPMContext Get the current capabilities Configuration of No bility of the context. Context

Mapping TSS TSP API to Java Classes



Package Layout

The namespace assigned to JSR 321

Package Summary	
javax.trustedcomputing	This package and its sub packages provide for integration of Trusted Computing in Java.
javax.trustedcomputing.tpm	This package allows to connect to a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).
javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.keys	This package allows the creation, storage, loading and unloading of hierarchies of TPM keys.
javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.structures	This package contains helper classes for interaction with various other classes from the javax.trustedcomputing.tpm package.
javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.tools	This package allows using various core concepts of Trusted Computing.



javax.trustedcomputing

Exception Summary		
<u>TrustedComputingException</u>	The default Exception used in the javax.trustedcomputing package.	

- The default Exception used in the javax.trustedcomputing package.
- It covers all unexpected behaviors on all levels of the trusted platform.
- This includes also the errors raised in lower layers of the TCG architecture such as error codes returned from the TPM, and the TSS and its sub-layers.
- Returns human-readable error messages and TCG compatible error codes



javax.trustedcomputing.tpm

Class Summary		
	The Context class is the centerpiece of the API. This package allows to connect to a Trusted Platform Module (TPM).	
<u>TPMContext</u>	The Context class is the centerpiece of the API. It serves as central object factory. All TPM-depending objects are created here. While there may exist several TPMContexts at the same time, all derived Objects (such as keys) are only valid within one Context session instance.	

Interface Summary		
<u>TPM</u>	This represents the hardware TPM and the basic functionalities it offers. It allows to query the status and capabilities of the hardware TPM and provides access to the random number generator. It also provides access to the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs).	



javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.keys

Class Summary		
<u>KeyManager</u>	Provides management functionality for TPM-based cryptographic keys.	
Interface Summary		
<u>BindingKey</u>	Binding keys protect data which is bound to a specific platform.	
<u>IdentityKey</u>	IdentityKeys perform signatures on data that originates within the TPM.	
<u>LeqacyKey</u>	LegacyKeys are the only TPM-based keys that are allowed to perform both signing and encryption operations.	:h
<u>SigningKey</u>	Signing keys sign arbitrary data.	
<u>StorageKey</u>	Storage keys wrap other keys or sealed data.	
<u>StorageRootKey</u>	The Storage Root Key (SRK) is the highest key in the TPM key hierarchy.	
<u>TPMKey</u>	Provides common functionality for all types of TPM -based keys, as created the KeyManager.	у
<u>TPMRSAKey</u>	Provides access to the public parts of the RSA keys used by version 1.2 TPMs.	
Toegl, Werner Keil	Princeton, September 10th, 2009	JSF

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javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.structures

Class Summary			
<u>Digest</u>	Provides a container for SHA-1 hash values.		
PCREvent	Holds the data to be extended into PCRs, together with event information that will be stored in the systems Stored Measurement Log (SML).		
PCRInfo	The contents of the Platform Configuration Registers (PCR) of a TPM can be used to report the configuration of a system.		
<u>Secret</u>	Provides conversion of password strings into the hashed binary format expected by the TPM.		
<u>ValidationData</u>	Holds all information necessary to validate that an operation that returns it was properly performed by an authentic TPM.		

This package contains helper classes for interaction with various other classes from the javax.trustedcomputing.tpm package. The classes in this package are passive, i.e. do not communicate with the hardware TPM directly.



javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.tools

Class Summary	
<u>Binder</u>	Provides all services for performing the TPM-bind operation on user data.
<u>Sealer</u>	Provides all services for performing TPM_SEAL on user data.
<u>Signer</u>	This class allows to sign user data or files using a SigningKey or a LegacyKey.
<u>TickStamper</u>	Allows to read the current tick counter of the TPM and to perform time stamping operations based on it.

This package allows using various core concepts of Trusted Computing.

- Small set of required tools.
- Designed to be extendible with additional features.

package demo.jsr321;



Example: How to seal a secret

Imports the API declarations

The implementation of the API is selected by specifying a specific implementation of TPMContext.

We open a connection to the TPM services of the local platform.

KeyManager and all key derived from it are bound to a TPMContext

```
import javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.TPMContext;
import javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.keys.KeyManager;
import javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.keys.StorageKey;
import javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.keys.StorageRootKey;
import javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.structures.Digest;
import javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.structures.PCRInfo;
import javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.structures.Secret;
import javax.trustedcomputing.tpm.tools.Sealer;
import junit.framework.TestCase;
/**
 * Performs tests on the Sealing functionality
 * @author rtoegl
 */
public class SealingTests extends TestCase {
      erforms a straightforward functional test on the Sealer class.
 public void testSealer() throws Exception {
    /**
                    an implementation of TPMContext.
     * First choose
     */
    TPMContext context = TPMContext
        .getInstance("cordelia.tpm.CordeliaTPMContext.java");
    context.connect();
    KeyManager keyManager = context.getKeyManager();
```

..example continued.

TPM Authentication secrets are easily constructed with default encoding.

Now we can instruct the TPM to create a cryptographic key with a specific policy.

We define a platform configuration as a set of PCR values.

Get a Sealer tool instance.


Use it to seal our little secret to this platform-bound key and configuration.

Finally, close the context.

```
Secret keyUsageSecret = context
    .getSecret("TheSecretPassword4SealingAndUnsealing");
StorageRootKey srk = keyManager
    .loadStorageRootKey(Secret.WELL KNOWN SECRET);
/**
 * We create a Key of type Storage key, which is non-migratable,
 * non-volatile and need authorization. Using the key is not bound to a
 * specific platform state. sealingKEy is wrapped by the Storage Root Key.
 */
StorageKey sealingKey = keyManager.createStorageKey(srk,
    keyUsageSecret, null, false, false, true, null);
byte[] dataToProtect = "My little secret".getBytes();
PCRInfo targetState = context.getPCRInfo();
Digest pcr12 = context.getDigest(new byte[] { 0xc, 0xa, 0xf, 0xe, 0x0,
    0x0, 0x0, 0x1 });
targetState.setPCRValue(12, pcr12);
Sealer sealer = context.getSealer();
byte[] sealedData = sealer.seal(dataToProtect, targetState, sealingKey);
// Done sealing data to the platform and its state!
```

context.close();

Java Community Process





How to participate

Get the Draft.

→ <u>http://jsr321.dev.java.net</u>

Read the specifications and comment on it!
jsr-321-comments@jcp.org

The Expert Group will then discuss your contributions.

Of course, you are also (more than) welcome to join as an Expert or, to provide implementations!



How to contact the Expert Group

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